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Abstract
The problems underlying the current slowdown of the Russian economy are of a persistent nature 
DQGFDQQRWEHUHVROYHGZLWKVLPSOHPHDVXUHVVXFKDVDVRIWHUPRQHWDU\RU¿VFDOSROLF\7KHIXQGDPHQ-
tal reason for these problems is the weak market environment dominated by public and quasi-public 
companies. A new growth model should be based upon strong incentive for the business, as well as the 
JRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQV\VWHPWRLPSURYHHI¿FLHQF\7KLVDUWLFOHGH¿QHVWKHPDLQVWHSVWREHWDNHQLQ
building such a model.
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Russia’s share in the world economy (at the current exchange rate) grew fourfold over the 
VDPHSHULRGIURPWR7KHZHOIDUHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQLQFUHDVHGFRQVLGHUDEO\UHDO
wages increased by 3.4 times, and real pensions increased by 2.8 times.




globe; however, the slowdown was not as sharp, even in oil producing countries ( Table 1). 
Russia’s absolute performance dropped, as did its relative position: from the leaders group 
 ً The updated English version of the article published in Russian in Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2014, No. 12, pp. 4–36. 






( mid-second decile growth rate worldwide), Russia dropped into the outsiders group 
( top-eighth decile).






The government took measures to boost growth, although it has not provided a clear 
DQVZHUDVWRWKHUHDVRQVIRUWKHVORZGRZQ,QRXURSLQLRQZLWKRXW¿QGLQJDQDQVZHULWZLOO
be impossible to overcome the stagnation of the Russian economy that borders on reces-
sion. There is no universal cure, just as there is no panacea for medical diseases. Moreover, 
measures that are expedient in some situations may have a negative impact in others. In this 
paper, we attempt to identify the reasons for the slowdown of the Russian economy and ways 
not only to improve the situation but also to achieve a complete turnaround.
2. Growth of the Russian economy in 2000–2013
:KDWGURYHJURZWKLQWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\EHIRUHWKHFULVLVDQGZK\GLGWKHROGGULYHUV
ORVHWKHLUHIIHFWDIWHULW"7DEOHSUHVHQWVJURZWKUDWHVRIVSHFL¿FFRPSRQHQWVRI*'3XWLOL]D-
tion. First, it should be noted that the growth rate in both investment and consumer domestic 
GHPDQGGXULQJWKHSUHFULVLVSHULRGRXWVWULSSHGWKDWRIWKH*'33K\VLFDOH[SRUWVJHQHUDOO\
JUHZDWDSSUR[LPDWHO\WKHVDPHUDWHDVWKH*'3,QWHUPVRIJURZWKGULYHUVRXUHFRQRP\
differed dramatically, for example, from China and other fast-growing countries in Southeast 
Asia where exports are the main growth driver.
Table 1 
$YHUDJHDQQXDOSUHFULVLVDQGSRVWFULVLVJURZWKUDWHV








South Africa 4.2 1.9
%UD]LO 3.7 2.7
Source: calculations based on IMF data (IMF, 2014).
Table 2 
$YHUDJHJURZWKUDWHVRI¿QDOGHPDQGFRPSRQHQWVLQFRQVWDQWSULFHV
Change over the period Average growth rate
2000–2008 2009–2013 2000–2008 2009–2013
*'3 82.5 5.3 6.9 1.0
'RPHVWLFGHPDQG 134.7 7.8 9.9 1.5
¿QDOFRQVXPSWLRQ 102.6 16.0 8.2 3.0
including households 145.3 20.9 10.5 3.9
gross investment 343.8 –12.6 18.0 –2.7
LQFOXGLQJ¿[HGFDSLWDO 199.9 5.1 13.0 1.0
exports 93.6 8.0 7.6 1.6
imports 433.4 18.8 20.4 3.5
Source: calculations based on Rosstat data.
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A detailed analysis reveals that for the Russian economy, export revenues were also one 
RIWKHJURZWKGULYHUVDOWKRXJKWKLVUHVXOWZDVPRUHRIDÀXNHGXHWRWKHLQFUHDVLQJSULFHVRI
oil, gas and other raw materials on the global market, rather than an increase in exports. To 
evaluate how much the Russian economy gained from higher hydrocarbon prices, we have 
calculated the windfall (or surplus) export revenues resulting from more expensive oil and 
gas for each year compared to 1999 (all prices converted into constant dollars).
7KHEDVH\HDUZKHQ8UDOVRLOFRVWEEOLVW\SLFDORIWKHV7KHDYHUDJH
SULFH LQGROODUVZDVEEOGXULQJ WKDWSHULRG'XH WR LQFUHDVHGK\GURFDUERQ
SULFHV 5XVVLD UHFHLYHG DGGLWLRQDO LQFRPH HTXLYDOHQW WR EHWZHHQ  DQG  RI*'3
RI*'3DQQXDOO\ RQ DYHUDJH IURP WR$IWHU WKH FULVLV IURP WR
 VXUSOXV UHYHQXHV ÀXFWXDWHG EHWZHHQ  DQG RI*'3ZKLOH EHIRUH WKH







More expensive exports accelerated economic growth mainly due to greater demand in 
several channels. As a result of reforms in taxation of oil and gas sectors implemented in 
SDUWRIWKHQDWXUDOUHQWDULVLQJIURPWKLVVHFWRURQDYHUDJHEHJDQWREHZLWK-
drawn in the federal budget (Gurvich, 2010). Combined with hydrocarbon price growth, it 
raised oil and gas revenues (understood as withholdings of the natural rent through resource 
payments and export duties) to the budget by 40 times from 2000 to 2008, or by eight times in 
real terms.1 This helped the government substantially reduce taxes in the non-primary materi-
als sector without harming the federal budget. Its total revenues nearly doubled in real terms 
over the period. Following the revenues, all types of government expenditures also grew. 
Thus, by 2008, public investments nearly tripled in real terms. The growing expenditures and 
wages in the public sector created additional consumer demand, while the increasing volume 
of government procurement boosted demand for industrial products.
 1 7RUHFDOFXODWHLQFRQVWDQWSULFHVDGRPHVWLFGHPDQGGHÀDWRUKDVEHHQXVHGEHFDXVHLQRXURSLQLRQWKLVLQGLFDWRU
is the most representative of domestic price trends.
Fig. 1. Estimated oil and gas windfalls. 
Source: authors’ calculations.
33Ⱥ.XGULQ(*XUYLFK5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV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The portion of surplus revenues remaining with producers after taxes was spent to raise 
wages throughout the economy, in addition to the oil, gas and metal sectors (Table 3). As 
a result , the growth in wages far exceeded productivity growth (measured as output volume 
per hour worked).
0RUHH[SHQVLYHH[SRUWVFRQWULEXWHG WR LQFUHDVHGEXVLQHVVSUR¿WV LH WKHPDLQVRXUFH
RIWKHLULQYHVWPHQWV+RZHYHUWKHSRVLWLYHLQÀXHQFHRIPRUHH[SHQVLYHH[SRUWSURGXFWVRQ
LQYHVWPHQWVZDVQRW OLPLWHGE\ LQFUHDVHGSUR¿WV7KH UDSLGJURZWK LQSURGXFWLRQFUHDWHG






The surplus oil revenues received by the federal budget between 2000 and 2008 were 
SDUWO\ VDYHG WRSUHYHQW WKHHFRQRP\ IURPRYHUKHDWLQJDQG LQÀDWLQJ DVZHOO DV WRHQVXUH
a margin of safety should oil prices fall. The retained surplus revenues were spent to repay 
WKHJRYHUQPHQWGHEWLWZDVUHGXFHGIURPELOOLRQLQHDUO\WRELOOLRQLQODWH
2008) and to build up public oil and gas funds.
Actually, the government pursued a counter-cyclical policy, dampening the impact of 
H[WHUQDOÀXFWXDWLRQVRQ WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\7KLVSROLF\ LV NQRZQ WRKHOS FRQVLGHUDEO\
reduce the negative impact of macroeconomic volatility on growth (Fatas, Mihov, 2009), 
ZKLFKLVHVSHFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWIRURLOSURGXFLQJFRXQWULHV.XGULQ'DYLVHWDO
7KLVZDVSURYHQGXULQJWKHFULVLVZKHQDVLJQL¿FDQWSRUWLRQRIWKH5HVHUYH)XQGZDV
spent to mitigate the consequences of plummeting oil prices. An analysis of the life-cycles 




in domestic demand. Repaying foreign debt at the expense of oil revenues and establishing 
WKH6WDELOL]DWLRQ)XQGODWHUWKH5HVHUYH)XQGDQG1DWLRQDO:HOIDUH)XQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\UH-
duced macro economic risks and ensured higher sovereign and corporate credit ratings and 
lower borrowing costs for all classes of Russian borrowers, thereby providing additional 
growth incentives.
From 2000 to 2013, savings in the form of early repayment of foreign debt and net savings 
(less expenses for creating public corporations, economic support in 2009, etc.) in oil and gas 
IXQGVPDGHXSDWRWDORIELOOLRQLQ86GROODUV7KXVapproximately 10% of total 
surplus oil and gas revenues from the economy and 15% of surplus oil and gas revenues from 
the federal budget were allocated for savings. If these funds had been spent entirely, general 












Source: calculations based on Rosstat data.
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2QHFDQKDUGO\DJUHHWKDWLWZDVWKLVLQVLJQL¿FDQWVXUSOXVWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWODFNHGIRU
diversifying the economy, ensuring innovative growth and achieving a strong competitive 
position (especially considering that from 2000 to 2013, government expenditures more than 
doubled in real terms). If all of the surplus revenues had been spent, we would have wit-






markets grew by nearly 20 times!
6HFRQGWKHIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHSROLF\RIWKH%DQNRI5XVVLDDJDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRIFRQ-
stantly increasing oil prices, led to expectations of a stable nominal ruble rate. As a result, 
international borrowings converted into rubles looked extremely attractive. In addition, the 
expansion of the domestic market, thanks to production growth and a strengthening ruble, 





ing visible risks for foreign investors).
A wide margin of macroeconomic safety was also created: the federal budget and current 
DFFRXQWH[SHULHQFHGDVWDEOHVXUSOXVVXEVWDQWLDOLQWHUQDWLRQDODQG¿VFDOUHVHUYHVZHUHDFFX-
mulated; and foreign debt was reduced considerably (although these achievements were also 
made possible due to high oil prices).
,QJHQHUDOZKHQIRUHLJQFDSLWDOLQÀRZLQWR5XVVLDUHDFKHGLWVSHDNLQDGGLWLRQDO
LQYHVWPHQW UHVRXUFHV H[FHHGHG  ELOOLRQ FRPSDUHGZLWK  GXH WR WKLV IDFWRU$Q
HVWLPDWHE\WKH(FRQRPLF([SHUW*URXS((*VKRZHGWKDWDQLQFUHDVHRIEEOLQRLOSULFHV
OHGWRDQLQFUHDVHLQFDSLWDOLQÀRZLQWRWKHFRXQWU\RIELOOLRQ
6XFK DGUDPDWLF WXUQDURXQG LQ SULYDWH FDSLWDO ÀRZV VSXUUHG DQ H[SORVLYH JURZWK LQ
lending . Fig. 3 shows a growth in accumulated loans issued to legal entities and individuals 
RIWLPHVLQUHDOWHUPVIURPWRRUIURPWRRI*'3$QRWKHUUHDVRQ
IRU WKLVJURZWKLV WKDWVRPHDUHDVRI WKH¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUKDGEHHQGHYHORSHGDOPRVWIURP
scratch. Thus, the real amount of loans to individuals grew by 46 times during the pre-crisis 
SHULRGDQDQQXDODYHUDJHRI
)LJVKRZVWKHPRYHPHQWRIDGGLWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVWKDWÀRZHGLQWRWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\















percentage points lower. This means inventories initially grew much faster than production 
RQDYHUDJHDQGODWHUJUHZPXFKVORZHU'XULQJWKHSUHFULVLVSHULRGWKLVFRPSRQHQWRI¿QDO
GHPDQGLQFUHDVHGWKHDYHUDJH*'3JURZWKUDWHE\SHUFHQWDJHSRLQWVDQGORZHUHGLWE\
0.8 percentage points after the crisis. In other words, the economy slowed down by nearly 
 2 7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQJURVVDFFXPXODWLRQDQG¿[HGFDSLWDODFFXPXODWLRQ





two percentage points during the transition from optimistic expectations, when producers 
increased their inventories, to pessimistic expectations, when inventories were reduced. 
7KHVLJQL¿FDQFHRILQYHQWRULHVPDQLIHVWHGLWVHOIGXULQJWKHFULVLVZKHQDUHFRUG
 decline in production was almost entirely caused by their reduction (otherwise, the slowdown 
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQRQO\
A number of studies present quantitative assessments of how oil prices affect growth indica-




mately 2.5 percentage points, which corresponds to an elasticity ratio of 0.2 (Suni, 2007).
%\ DSSO\LQJ WKH DERYH HVWLPDWHV WR SUHFULVLV RLO SULFH JURZWK GDWDZH FDQ SODFH WKH
FRUUHVSRQGLQJ LQFUHPHQW WR5XVVLD¶V*'3JURZWK DW ±SHU \HDU7KXV RXW RI WKH
 DYHUDJH JURZWK UDWH GXULQJ WKLV SHULRG URXJKO\ KDOIZDV FDXVHG E\ IDYRUDEOH DQG
FRQWLQXRXVO\LPSURYLQJH[WHUQDOFRQGLWLRQV³,QWULQVLF´JURZWKDFFRXQWVIRUWKHUHPDLQLQJ
±FRPSDUHGZLWKWKHJURZWKUDWHRIWKHJOREDOHFRQRP\&DOFXODWLRQVE\((*




The connection between surplus oil and gas revenues and economic growth is shown in Fig. 5. 
,WEHFDPHHVSHFLDOO\FORVHLQ+RZHYHUEHIRUHWKHFULVLVWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQVXUSOXV
UHYHQXHJURZWKDQGWKH*'3JURZWKUDWHZDV²IURPWRLWMXPSHGWR
Thus, the main growth driver in the Russian economy before the crisis was the massive 
LQÀRZRIH[WHUQDOUHVRXUFHVLQWRWKHFRXQWU\7KLVDOORZVXVWRFRQYHQWLRQDOO\FKDUDFWHUL]H
the economic mechanism functioning at that time as an “imported growth model.”2IFRXUVH
not all of the production growth was determined by external resources. It was partly caused 
by dynamic growth in the overall global economy (and a respective expansion of foreign 
demand on the Russian production). For the most part, however, it was likely due to market 
IRUFHVDIWHUWKHWUDQVLWLRQSHULRGDQGDIWHUWKH¿QDQFLDOFULVLVRIHQGHG
+RZHYHUDIWHUWKHFULVLVRWKHUIDFWRUVDFWXDOO\FHDVHGWRKDYHDQHIIHFWSRVVLEO\
because of new and unfavorable conditions, including uncertainty in the macroeconomic 
environment, exchange rate volatility in particular (Rautava, 2013) and inconsistency in 
Fig. 5. *'3JURZWKUDWHDQGVXUSOXVRLODQGJDVUHYHQXHV
Sources: Rosstat; authors’ calculations.
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govern ment actions in a number of issues (with the most vivid example being the numerous 
XQSUHGLFWDEOHFKDQJHVLQGHFLVLRQVRYHUWKHIXQGHGSHQVLRQV\VWHP7KH:RUOG%DQNDUJXHV
WKDWWKLVOHGWRD³FULVLVRIFRQ¿GHQFH´RQWKHSDUWRILQYHVWRUV:RUOG%DQNE,QWKH
end, growth became almost entirely determined by changes in oil and gas revenues.
3. Potential and prospects for the existing growth model
To evaluate the potential of the current economic growth model, two questions need to be 
answered. First, are there any drivers for its development, suggesting a reduction in resource 
dependence? Second, is there any hope that certain conditions will be created in the near 
IXWXUHWRPDNHWKHLPSRUWHGJURZWKPRGHOZRUNDJDLQ"7RDQVZHUWKH¿UVWTXHVWLRQZHZLOO
conduct an additional analysis of government and corporate behavior on the one hand, and of 
the results achieved on the other.
$VWKHIRUHLJQLQÀRZRIUHYHQXHVDQGFDSLWDOEHFDPHWKHPDLQGULYHURIHFRQRPLFJURZWK
economic policy gradually focused on the allocation of these resources. In the early 2000s, 
UHIRUPVZHUHSULPDULO\GLUHFWHGDWVROYLQJEDVLFLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVVXHVWKHQHZ%XGJHW&RGH
Tax Code, Labor Code, and Land Code were enacted and reforms were carried out in the 
electricity sector) and creating favorable business conditions (a red tape cutting program was 
implemented, and the tax burden was decreased on the non-primary materials sector). Starting 
mid-2000s the prevailing trend was increasing government involvement in the economy, and 
WKHPDLQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHWRROZDVWKHDOORFDWLRQRI¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV$WWKDWVWDJHJURZWK




%DQN 9(% H[SDQGHG LWV IXQFWLRQV DQG VFDOH RI EXVLQHVV &RQFXUUHQWO\ VHYHUDO SXEOLF
 corporations were established, some of which included companies that had previously oper-
ated (quite successfully in some cases) based on market principles. Moreover, the United 
Aircraft Construction Company and the United Shipbuilding Company were consolidated. 
2WKHU GHFLVLRQVZHUHPDGH DW WKH VDPH WLPH HJ WR GHOLPLW WKH DXWKRULWLHV RI GLIIHUHQW
EXGJHW OHYHOV RU EHQH¿WPRQHWL]DWLRQ EXW WKH\ QR ORQJHU GH¿QHG WKHPDLQ FRXUVH RI WKH
government’s policy.
To illustrate the change in this economic policy vector, we can compare two pension re-
forms carried out in the 2000s.
The 2002 reform involved breakthrough institutional changes. A funded pillar of the pen-
sion system was created. The insurance pillar of retirement pensions was based on the inter-
QDWLRQDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHG1'&SULQFLSOHWKDWDOORZHGWKHSHQVLRQVL]HWREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK




pension system or create appropriate incentives.
7KHLQWHQWLRQWRVXSSRUWEXVLQHVVRSHUDWLRQVZDVSUDFWLFDOO\OLPLWHGWRDOORFDWLQJ¿QDQFLDO
resources in a certain form. Tax exemptions became very common. In 2012, their total value 
ZDVHTXLYDOHQWWRRIWKH*'337KLV¿JXUHUHÀHFWLQJGLUHFWEHQH¿WVVKRXOGEHVXSSOH-
mented with many implied subsidies. Thus, decreased export duties on petroleum products 
EDVLFDOO\PHDQDGHFUHDVHGWD[EXUGHQRQRLOSURFHVVLQJ+RZHYHUPRUHRIWHQWKDQQRWVXFK
a policy has led to the opposite result, allowing subsidy recipients to successfully survive 
ZLWKRXWPRGHUQL]DWLRQ*XUYLFK$VDUHVXOWDODJLQ5XVVLDQRLOSURFHVVLQJKDGEXLOW
 3 Main lines of Russian Federation tax policy for 2015 and for the planning period of 2016 and 2017. http://www.
PLQ¿QUXFRPPRQXSORDGOLEUDU\PDLQ1%3BSGI
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up for a long time: according to the Institute of Energy Strategy, the average oil processing 
GHSWKZDVIURPWRFRPSDUHGZLWKLQ23(&FRXQWULHV
The rapid expansion of domestic demand affected corporate strategies. They became 
RULHQWHGPDLQO\DURXQGLQFUHDVLQJSURGXFWLRQZKLOHHI¿FLHQF\LPSURYHPHQWVZHUHUHJDUGHG
as a secondary objective. Table 4 demonstrates: in terms of the share of businesses that 
 believe the expansion of production capacity is a result of innovative activity, Russia is com-
parable to other transition economies. At the same time, the share of companies that consider 
GHFUHDVHGODERUFRVWVWREHDQLPSRUWDQWUHVXOWZDVLQVLJQL¿FDQW,WLVDOVRZRUWKPHQWLRQLQJ
WKDWLQIRUHLJQFRXQWULHVWKH¿QDQFLDOFULVLVIRUFHGFRPSDQLHVWRERRVWWKHLUFRVWUHGXFWLRQ
activities, whereas Russian companies made almost no changes to their strategies. There 




Its obvious weakness is that production depends heavily on external factors: a renewed in-
ÀRZRI¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVERRVWVJURZWKZKLOHDFRUUHVSRQGLQJUHGXFWLRQOHDGVWRGHFOLQH
(as in 2009).
+RZHYHU ZKDWZDV WKH HI¿FLHQF\ LQ DSSO\LQJ WKH KXJH DGGLWLRQDO ¿QDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV
5XVVLDUHFHLYHGGXULQJWKHV"'LGWKH\KHOSQRWRQO\UDLVHOLYLQJVWDQGDUGVDQGH[SDQG
production, but also create a sturdy foundation for further economic growth, i.e., improve its 
competitiveness?
As one of the criteria for answering these questions, we can use the trend of Russia’s share 






share of global markets has not diminished, despite much higher dollar wages.
Let us take a more detailed look at the trend in production of tradable products. Fig. 6 
shows that the overall production growth was mainly attributable to the non-tradable sec-
Table 4 
6KDUHRIFRPSDQLHVHVWLPDWLQJFHUWDLQUHVXOWVRILQQRYDWLYHDFWLYLW\DVSULPDU\
Year Russia %XOJDULD 3RODQG &]HFK5HSXEOLF
Enhanced production capacity
2008 21.1 21.7 25.7 26.1
2012 24.1 27.1 31.8 24.2
Labor cost reduction
2008 4.5 15.9 13.8 18.2




%UDQFK 2001 2008 2013
Non-fuel 0.88 1.21 1.02
Machinery and equipment 0.28 0.30 0.33
For reference: Russia’s share of the global economy 0.94 2.67 2.81
Source: authors’ calculation based on data from the Russian Federal Customs Service and the International Trade 
Center.
39Ⱥ.XGULQ(*XUYLFK5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV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WRU7KH DYHUDJH JURZWK UDWH LQ RXWSXW IURP WUDGDEOH LQGXVWULHVZDV  IURP  WR
20084VRPHZKDWVORZHUWKDQIRUWKHRYHUDOOJOREDOHFRQRP\ZKLOHWKHQRQWUDGDEOH




hind the global economy. It is worth noting that investments were also allocated mainly for 
in dustries  oriented toward non-tradable products and services or for the primary materials 
sector (Table 6).
7KH VXUSDVVLQJ JURZWK RI WKH QRQWUDGDEOH VHFWRU LV DVLJQ RI WKH ³'XWFK GLVHDVH´
+RZHYHUDQXPEHURIVWXGLHVUHYHDOHGRQO\SDUWLDOV\PSWRPVLQWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\ZLWK
QR HYLGHQWPDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI WKH GLVHDVH HJ2RPHV DQG.DOFKHYD 'REU\QVND\D
and Turkisch, 2010). Thus, rising oil prices had a positive effect on production output in 
PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHV LH WKHPDLQ V\PSWRPRI WKH'XWFK GLVHDVHZDV QRW LQ SODFH
( Kuboniwa, 2012).
At the same time, we may presume that Russia failed to avoid the more general effect of 
WKH³UHVRXUFHFXUVH´ZKLFKSUHGLFWV DQHJDWLYH LQÀXHQFHRI UHVRXUFHDEXQGDQFHRQ ORQJ
term economic growth due to the deterioration of government institutions. Thus, resource 
dependence and the lengthy experience of living under socialism hindered the creation of 
market institutions in transition economies and negatively affected economic growth indica-
WRUV%HFNDQG/DHYHQ$QRWKHUVWXG\SURYHVWKDWWKHJUHDWHUWKHSURSRUWLRQRIH[WUDF-
 4 Comparable sets of indicators have only been calculated by Rosstat since 2002.
Fig. 6.,QGH[RISK\VLFDOSURGXFWLRQYROXPHE\VHFWRU 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Rosstat data.
Table 6 
6WUXFWXUHRI¿[HGFDSLWDOLQYHVWPHQWVE\W\SHRIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\
Industry 1999 2008 2012
Mining 14.5 13.4 14.3
Manufacturing 18.1 14.8 13.2
Transportation and communication 18.6 23.0 27.5
Real estate transactions 16.6 18.4 15.4
2WKHU 32.2 30.4 29.6
Source: calculations based on Rosstat data.
40 Ⱥ.XGULQ(*XUYLFK5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
tion industries in the economy of Russia’s regions, the lower the quality of the administration 
'H5RVDDQG,RRWW
:HFDQQRZVXPPDUL]HWKHUHVXOWV7KHKXJHVXUSOXVUHYHQXHVWKHFRXQWU\UHFHLYHGGXH
to favorable conditions in the primary materials markets considerably accelerated produc-
tion growth, ensured a record-breaking increase in household income (together with wages in 
all branches, including the public sectors, pensions, etc.), and enhanced macroeconomic sta-
bility. At the same time, one cannot say that the substantial resources allocated for economic 
PRGHUQL]DWLRQ LQ WKH IRUPRIJRYHUQPHQW LQYHVWPHQWV H[SHQVHV IRU FUHDWLQJGHYHORSPHQ-
tal institutions, various subsidies, etc.) yielded any tangible results, as Russia’s international 
FRPSHWLWLYHQHVVKDVQRW LPSURYHG7KLVSXWV LQTXHVWLRQ WKHDELOLW\RI WKH³UHVRXUFHEDVHG
approach” to create conditions for long-term economic growth.
7KHSHULRG IURP WRFRQ¿UPV WKLV FRQFOXVLRQ ,QRLO SULFHV LQFUHDVHG
DJDLQEUHDNLQJKLVWRULFUHFRUGVDQGVWD\HGDWWKDWOHYHO&DSLWDOÀRZVLQWRGHYHORSLQJFRXQW
ULHV DQGHPHUJLQJPDUNHWVÀXFWXDWHGDURXQGD¿JXUHEHORZ WKH UHFRUG OHYHORIEXW





1RZ WR WKH VHFRQG TXHVWLRQ LV WKHUH DQ\ KRSH IRU DUHWXUQ RI WKH H[WHUQDO ¿QDQFLDO
 resources that will restart the old growth model? To answer this question, we need to look 
at the functional external and internal conditions of the Russian economy in the near future.
Oil prices. After reaching a historic high in 2011, the price of oil has been continuously 
declining. Most forecasts assume that oil prices will continue falling on the global market 
LQWKHQHDUIXWXUH7KXVWKH,0)SUHGLFWVLQLWV2FWREHUIRUHFDVWWKDWGXULQJWKHQH[W
VL[\HDUVRLOSULFHVZLOOGURSPRUHWKDQLQFRQVWDQWGROODUV,0))LJ(YHQ
more pessimistic is the forecast by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014), which pre-
GLFWVWKHRLOSULFHZLOOIDOOEHORZEEOLQFRQVWDQWGROODUVE\7KLVGRZQZDUGWUHQG
is caused by enhanced production of shale oil in the U.S. and a high probability that Iran, 
Libya and Iraq will reappear in the market along with a simultaneous decline in demand in 
GHYHORSLQJDVZHOODVGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV7KHGLYH LQRLOTXRWHV LQ2FWREHU1RYHPEHU
2014 proves that hydrocarbon prices may begin to fall faster.





trend forecast (published in 2014) for future years.
Source:DXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQ%3%3DQG,0)GDWD,0)
41Ⱥ.XGULQ(*XUYLFK5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
( period between two peaks) was approximately 30 years in past few decades. These conclu-
sions and the cited forecasts suggest that we have passed another price peak and are now in 
a declining phase. Judging by past experience, this phase may last approximately 15 years.
Oil production volumes. As predicted by the Russian government, oil prices will remain at 
the same level5 over the next 15 years. As part of its sanctions, the U.S. imposed restrictions 
on supplying Russia with equipment for recovering tight oil. Combined with decreasing 




winding up the quantitative easing program and interest rates are gradually rising in leading 
FRXQWULHVFDSLWDOZLOOJRWKHUH7KLVLVSDUWLDOO\UHÀHFWHGLQIRUHFDVWVE\WKH:RUOG%DQNWKDW
SUHGLFWHGDUHGXFWLRQRIQHWFDSLWDOLQÀRZLQWRHPHUJLQJPDUNHWV:RUOG%DQND
Demographic forecast. According to Rosstat, the working age population will decline 
continuously throughout the coming years.6 In the medium forecast, this group will shrink by 
ZLWKLQ\HDUV*LYHQWKLVWKHJRYHUQPHQWH[SHFWVDQUHGXFWLRQLQWKHZRUNIRUFHE\
2030. This trend may impose a heavy limitation on growth for the Russian economy.
Wage growth. The Russian economy has experienced a number of detrimental adjust-
ments in primary income distribution over the past few years. From 2006 to 2013, the labor 
SD\PHQW VKDUH LQFUHDVHGE\SHUFHQWDJHSRLQWVZKLOH WKH VKDUHRI JURVV SUR¿W IHOO E\
7.3 percentage points (Fig. 8). This means that each year the aggregate supply curve has been 
shifting to the left, the investment attractiveness of the Russian economy has been falling, 
and corporate investment resources have been reduced, which is especially important in the 
HYHQWRIOLPLWHGDFFHVVWR¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
Natural monopoly tariffs. From 2008 to 2013, domestic gas prices for industrial consumers 
JUHZE\WLPHVLHWKHJURZWKH[FHHGHGWKHFRQVXPHUSULFHLQGH[E\DOPRVW
&RQVLGHULQJWKDWJDVDFFRXQWVIRUQHDUO\RIWKHIXHOXVHGIRUHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQ
this means higher prices for heat and electricity. Railway freight tariffs also grew slightly more 
WKDQFRQVXPHUSULFHV+DYLQJIUR]HQWKHWDULIIVRIQDWXUDOPRQRSROLHVLQWKHJRYHUQ
ment intends to gradually increase them beginning next year. Combined with faster wage 
growth, this makes supporting the competitiveness of Russian producers quite  problematic.
 5 KWWSHFRQRP\JRYUXPLQHFDFWLYLW\VHFWLRQVPDFURSURJQR]GRFB
 6 KWWSZZZJNVUXZSVZFPFRQQHFWURVVWDWBPDLQURVVWDWUXVWDWLVWLFVSRSXODWLRQGHPRJUDSK\
Fig. 8. 7KHVKDUHRIZDJHVDQGJURVVSUR¿WLQ*'3%). 
Source: Rosstat.
42 Ⱥ.XGULQ(*XUYLFK5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
Lending. Lending growth limits are nearly exhausted in certain domains (primarily 
UHWDLO,QWKHFRPLQJ\HDUVWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\ZLOOKDUGO\¿QGLWVHOILQDQLGHDOVLWXDWLRQ
ZLWKDQ³LPSRUWHGJURZWKPRGHO´2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHHFRQRP\ZLOOKDYHWRIDFHDGLI¿FXOW
environment that is far from favorable. The new issues arising in connection with develop-
ments in Crimea, East Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions will become another formidable 
IDFWRUIXUWKHUDJJUDYDWLQJWKHVLWXDWLRQ7KH\ZLOOOLPLWFDSLWDOLQÀRZLQWR5XVVLDDQGVORZ




nisms that had contributed to the economy’s growth will slow it down instead. Conside ring 
WKDWWKHVWDELOL]DWLRQRIRLOSULFHVKDVOHGWRVWDJQDWLRQWKHLUGHFUHDVHLIWKHROGJURZWKPRGHO
is left in place) may result in a protracted recession. 
7KH REMHFWLYH IDFWRUV QDPHG DERYH DUH VXSSOHPHQWHG E\ DVLJQL¿FDQW GHWHULRUDWLRQ LQ
 expectations by economic agents, which is hampering production enhancement and, conse-
quently, investment expansion. In turn, reduced economic activity is detrimental to expecta-





HFRQRP\ZLOOEHXQWLODQGZLOO IDOO WREHWZHHQDQG 2(&'
$FFRUGLQJWRFDOFXODWLRQVE\*XUYLFKDQG3ULOHSVN\ORQJWHUPDYHUDJHJURZWK
UDWHVIRU WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\ZLOOEH)ROORZLQJ WKHQH[W UHYLVLRQRI WKHPLGWHUP





Russia’s share of the global economy will rapidly fall.




economy faces a downturn. Countries that found themselves in this type of situation during 
the crisis (e.g., Greece) faced the problem where costs cannot be cut in proportion to falling 
UHYHQXHVZKLOHERUURZLQJEHFRPHVLPSRVVLEOHEHFDXVHRIWKHJURZLQJGH¿FLW$VDUHVXOW
all those countries had to go through an economically and socially painful period when the 
government’s obligations were dramatically reduced. The situation became even more dif-
¿FXOWGXHWRWKHKDVWHZLWKZKLFKWKHFKDQJHRFFXUUHG
An analysis demonstrated that the problems in the Russian economy are of a persistent 
and long-term nature. ,IRLOSULFHVGRQRWJURZUDSLGO\DJDLQDQGWKLVVFHQDULRVHHPVQHDUO\
impossible), the existing model will not be able to ensure economic growth. Nothing promises 
that the economy will be able to overcome stagnation without a new growth model.
7KH JRYHUQPHQW UHDOL]HV WKH JUDYLW\ RI WKH VLWXDWLRQ 7KH ³0DLQ /LQHV RI 5XVVLDQ
*RYHUQPHQW$FWLYLW\WKURXJK´7VSHFL¿HVWKDWZLWKRXWDQDFWLYHHFRQRPLFSROLF\HFR-
QRPLFJURZWKZLOOVORZGRZQWR±SHU\HDUZKLFKZLOOQRWDOORZWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLF
and social development to be in balance. Thus, building a new growth model for the Russian 




4. The outline of the new economic growth model
Let us consider possible ways to restore the growth of the Russian economy based on the 
³JURZWKGLDJQRVWLFV´SULQFLSOHGHYHORSHGE\'5RGULNDQGXVHGLQDQXPEHURIFRXQWULHV
5RGULN+HSURSRVHGDQDOJRULWKPLQZKLFKWKH¿UVWVWHSLVWRLGHQWLI\NH\REVWDFOHV
to growth and then select measures to be implemented in the existing political environment 
using existing administrative resources, etc., that are capable of removing or at least soften-
ing the most basic restrictions.
'LDJQRVWLFV VKRXOG EHJLQ ZLWK LGHQWLI\LQJ WKHPDLQ UHDVRQ IRU XQVDWLVIDFWRU\ JURZWK
HLWKHUWKHHFRQRP\KDVLQVXI¿FLHQWDFFHVVWR¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVRUHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\LQWKH
FRXQWU\GRHVQRWSURYLGHVXI¿FLHQWSUR¿WDELOLW\WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWFRVWV
and risks). This selection practically determines all of the options for restoring economic 
JURZWK ,IZH GHHP WKHPDLQ FDXVH WR EH LQVXI¿FLHQW ¿QDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV WKHQ HFRQRPLF
















:KDW DUH WKHPRVW LPSRUWDQW ULVNV DQG KRZ FDQ WKH\ EHPLWLJDWHG"$PRQJ WKH FLWHG
 reasons for Russia’s poor investment attractiveness, one of the most common is the low 
quality of the institutional environment (weak property rights protection, imperfect court 
V\VWHPKLJKDGPLQLVWUDWLYHEDUULHUVFRUUXSWLRQ:KLOHZHGRUHFRJQL]HWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
these factors, in our opinion, the main problem of the Russian economy is even deeper and is 
rooted in weak market mechanisms. A mature market system consists of agents (companies, 
banks, employees ) having strong incentives and competing according to established rules. 
Unfortunately, none of these conditions actually occur in the Russian economy.
7KHEDQNLQJDQGQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUVDUHERWKGRPLQDWHGE\SXEOLFTXDVLSXEOLFSXEOLF
corporations), or mixed (partially state-owned) companies. As a rule, these companies are 
guided by a substantially distorted motivation, that is, they are less interested in earning 
DSUR¿WDQGWKHLUFRPPHUFLDODFWLYLW\LVRIWHQFRPELQHGZLWKWKHDFWXDOIXQFWLRQRID³JRYHUQ
PHQWDJHQW´7KH\DUHOHVVOLDEOHIRUWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFHUHVXOWVDVORVVHVFDQEHFRYHUHGE\




Quasi-public companies may demonstrate even less market-focused behavior than fully 
VWDWHRZQHGHQWHUSULVHV9DKDEL2QHFDQDVVXPHWKDWWKLVLVDOVRWUXHLQ5XVVLDZKHUH
public corporations are non-commercial, even from a legal standpoint. Moreover, as many 
studies suggest (e.g., Sharafutdinova and Kisunko, 2014), close informal ties between the 
state and business are characteristic of this country, which both directly and indirectly puts 
FRPSDQLHVDI¿OLDWHGZLWKWKHVWDWHLQDSULYLOHJHGSRVLWLRQ2IFRXUVHWKHUHDUHH[FHSWLRQV
44 Ⱥ.XGULQ(*XUYLFK5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
to this general tendency. Thus, some researchers have found that Russian state-owned banks 
DUHPRUHHI¿FLHQW WKDQSULYDWHRQHV.DUDVHWDODOWKRXJK WKHUHDVRQVEHKLQG WKLV
DUHSHUKDSVWKHLQGLUHFWDGYDQWDJHVRIDI¿OLDWLRQZLWKWKHVWDWHZKLFKJXDUDQWHHVWKHKLJK
 reliability of those banks in the eyes of their customers.




paper, the Soviet economy demonstrated the poorest dynamics of factor productivity in the 
world from 1960 to 1989.
The objective to enhance market mechanisms goes far beyond improving the invest-
ment climate. For example, the underdeveloped market environment leads to an inaccurate 
HYDOXDWLRQRIEXVLQHVVSHUIRUPDQFHGRHVQRWHQFRXUDJHWKHEHVWSURGXFHUVRU¿OWHURXWWKH
worst ones, and does not encourage businesses to search for new, improved strategies. As 
a result, economic resources are not allocated to the best-performing industries, demand for 
innovations is non-existent, and the need to support domestic producers increases the burden 
on the budget, thus making the economy lag further behind in its development.
The most important sign of a non-market environment is a greatly diminished dependence 
RIFRPSDQLHVRQWKHLUHFRQRPLFUHVXOWV-.RUQDLFRLQHGWKHWHUP³VRIWEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWV´
6%&VWRGHQRWHVXFKDVLWXDWLRQVKRZLQJWKDW6%&VDUHDQLQHYLWDEOHIHDWXUHRIDQHFRQ-
omy managed by the state, resulting in an excessive, unproductive use of all resources 
.RUQDL7KHIDFWRUVOHDGLQJWR6%&VLVWKHZLOOLQJQHVVRIWKHVWDWHWRSXWXSZLWK
WKHLQHI¿FLHQWSHUIRUPDQFHRI³RZQ´FRPSDQLHVFRPSHQVDWLQJWKHPZLWK¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUW
WKURXJKGLUHFW VXEVLGLHV WD[ EHQH¿WV SUHIHUHQWLDO ORDQV HWF FRPIRUWDEOH UHJXODWLRQ RI
SULFHVDQGWDULIIVSUHIHUHQFHLQSODFLQJJRYHUQPHQWRUGHUVDQGGHSRVLWVHWF,WLVWKH6%&
PHFKDQLVP¿UVWRIDOO WKHRSSRUWXQLW\ WRREWDLQ ORDQVDWQRQPDUNHW WHUPV WKDWUHGXFHV
WKHLQFHQWLYHIRUVWDWHRZQHGFRPSDQLHVWRLPSURYHWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFH%DUWHODQG+DUULVRQ
1999). The weak link in such a system is state-owned monopolies, which have no competi-
WLRQDQGRSHUDWHXQGHU6%&V
The distorted motivation of public and quasi-public companies not only determines their 
own actions but also affects all market players. Suppliers of the state or state-owned compa-
nies lose incentives to cut costs because they can include them in their prices comparatively 
HDVLO\GXHWRJRYHUQPHQWLQHI¿FLHQF\LQSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQWUHJXODWLRQRIQDWXUDOPRQRSR-
ly prices, etc.). Consequently, producers of similar products feel no pressure either, which is 
translated all the way down the supply chain. As a result, this phenomenon is common across 
the economy, and the competitive performance of producers deteriorates.
The standard tools of economic policy may not work in a non-market environment. 
For example, strong competition is one of the main incentives for companies to improve 
SHUIRUPDQFH2VSLQDDQG6FKLIIEDXHU+RZHYHUVXFKDUHVXOWLVRQO\REVHUYHGZLWK
UHODWLYHO\³DGYDQFHG´5XVVLDQFRPSDQLHV³ODJJLQJ´FRPSDQLHVPD\H[SHULHQFHVORZGH-
YHORSPHQW LQ DFRPSHWLWLYH HQYLURQPHQW $JKLRQ DQG %HVVRQRYD $FFRUGLQJ WR
<%HVVRQRYDWKHSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQSURGXFWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHLVEHLQJKHOG
back in the Russian economy by the co-existence of companies with high and low produc-
WLYLW\GXHWRLQVWLWXWLRQDOH[LWEDUULHUVIRUWKHOHDVWHI¿FLHQWFRPSDQLHV%HVVRQRYD




In other words, creating the necessary motivation requires a dramatic increase in posi-
WLYH LQFHQWLYHVDQGJUHDWHU UHVSRQVLELOLW\DPRQJDOO¿QDQFLDODQGQRQ¿QDQFLDOFRPSDQLHV
in the market for their operational results. This requires improving the market environment: 




Another very important consequence of high risks for all players in the Russian economy 
LVWKHVKLIWWRZDUGVROXWLRQVZLWKVKRUWUHWXUQV:LWKUHJDUGWRKRXVHKROGVWKLVVLWXDWLRQLV
LOOXVWUDWHGE\DVWXG\SXEOLVKHGLQ:DQJHWDO
The test respondents in 45 countries (including developed and developing countries, as well 
DVHPHUJLQJPDUNHWVZHUHDVNHGWRFKRRVHEHWZHHQUHFHLYLQJLQWKHFXUUHQWPRQWK






business strategies to the objective of increasing output over cutting costs. Satisfying existing 
demand by simply increasing output produces an immediate effect, while the effects from 
PRGHUQL]LQJSURGXFWLRQ WDNHPXFKPRUH WLPH7KH VKLIW RI WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHV
toward current objectives has been especially visible in the pension policy lately, with grow-
ing allocations for current pension payments and reducing allocations for future pensions. 
+RZHYHUWKHIRFXVRQLPPHGLDWHUHVXOWVLVEHFRPLQJHYHUPRUHQRWLFHDEOHLQRWKHULQGXVW
ries as well. This must be caused, on the one hand, by the continuing critical dependence of 
WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\RQXQSUHGLFWDEOHÀXFWXDWLRQVLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWVDQGRQWKHRWKHU
KDQGE\IUHTXHQWFKDQJHVLQIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDO³UXOHVRIWKHJDPH´ZKLFKDFFHOHUDWHDV
excessive government regulation grows.
³6KRUWVLJKWHG´ SUHIHUHQFHV VHULRXVO\ KDPSHU UHIRUPV DV WKHLU SRVLWLYH HIIHFWV DUH QRW
XVXDOO\ REVHUYHG ULJKW DZD\ ,W LV WKLV ³VKRUWVLJKWHGQHVV´ UDWKHU WKDQ HUURUV LQPRQHWDU\





the disrupted balance between long-term and short-term goals.
The various measures recently announced, developed or implemented by the government 
FDQEHGLYLGHGLQWRWKUHHJURXSV7KH¿UVWJURXSFRQVLVWVRIWKHZLGHO\GLVFXVVHGPHDVXUHV
IRU¿VFDODQGRUPRQHWDU\VWLPXODWLRQRIWKHHFRQRP\VXFKDVUHGXFLQJWKH%DQNRI5XVVLD
base rate). The second comprises measures to increase budget expenditures (this implies the 
weakening of the budget rule) or to provide additional funding for investment projects at the 
H[SHQVHRIWKH1DWLRQDO:HOIDUH)XQGRUWKH%DQNRI5XVVLDSURYLGLQJUH¿QDQFLQJIRUORDQV
issued for investment projects), etc. Finally, the third group includes measures to improve the 
HFRQRPLFHQYLURQPHQWLQFOXGLQJWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW:HZLOOWU\WRHYDOXDWHZKHWKHU
the measures proposed help make the Russian economy more market-focused and reduce the 
risks impeding its growth.
Stimulus measuresDUHDVWDQGDUGWRRORIFRXQWHUF\FOLFDOSROLF\DQGDUHMXVWL¿HGLQDVKRUW
UHFHVVLRQDVLQRU±+RZHYHULIZHKDYHHQWHUHGDSURWUDFWHGERXWRIORZ





for 2014. The process could only be slowed after providing liquidity to the banks. It is clear 
WKDWDVRIWHUPRQHWDU\SROLF\ZRXOGKDYHRQO\OHGWRIXUWKHUFDSLWDORXWÀRZLQVWHDGRIJURZWK
LQGRPHVWLFGHPDQG:HEHOLHYHWKDWDSURSRVDOWRXVHLQFHQWLYHVLVDQH[DPSOHRIVWDQGDUG
recommendations that will not work in the current non-standard situation.
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In the second group, the measures that involve increasing budget expenditures and funding 
additional large-scale projects are aimed at replacing external resources with other sources, and 
they mainly suggest giving away these resources to public companies. This means that attempts 
are being made to preserve the old model instead of creating a new one. Moreover, heavy 
constraints arise when implementing these types of measures. First, their funding sources are 
QRZUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKHVDYLQJVDFFXPXODWHGLQWKH1DWLRQDO:HOIDUH)XQGGXULQJWKHSHULRGRI
stable improvement in the oil markets. In other words, the sources are the quite limited remains 
RIH[WHUQDOVXUSOXVUHYHQXHV7KHUHIRUH WKLVFDQRQO\UHVXOW LQDVKRUWWHUPUHYLWDOL]DWLRQRI
production until the reserves are exhausted. Second, as demonstrated by the analysis of interna-
WLRQDOH[SHULHQFHLPSOHPHQWLQJLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWVSRVLWLYHO\LQÀXHQFHVHFRQRPLFJURZWK









out when acutely needed, the actual result of the second group of measures would be to delay 
the creation of a new growth model, i.e., the loss of precious time.
An example of measures to improve the investment climate and business environment 
LV WKH³URDGPDSV´LQFOXGHGLQWKH1DWLRQDO(QWUHSUHQHXULDO,QLWLDWLYH1(, LQYROYLQJWKH
UHPRYDORINH\OLPLWDWLRQVRQEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHV2QHRIWKHPLQYROYHVUHGXFLQJWKHQXPEHU
of administrative procedures necessary to obtain a construction permit from 51 in 2012 to 
11 in 2018 and their duration from 423 days to 56 days. Successful implementation of these 
PHDVXUHVPD\PDNHWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\VXEVWDQWLDOO\PRUHDWWUDFWLYHWRLQYHVWRUV+RZ-
HYHUVROYLQJWKHVHWDVNVLVYHU\GLI¿FXOWEHFDXVHWKHUHVXOWVZLOOEHGHWHUPLQHGQRWRQO\E\




as with the road maps today, ambitious quantitative goals were set for facilitating customs 
clearance for imports and exports. Nevertheless, Russia ranked 155th out of 178 countries by 
WKLVLQGLFDWRULQWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V'RLQJ%XVLQHVVUDWLQJ:RUOG%DQN
7R VXPPDUL]HZH FDQ VD\ WKDW WKHPHDVXUHV GLVFXVVHG RU LPSOHPHQWHG WRGD\ DUH QRW
consistent with the scale of the problems facing the Russian economy. A new growth model 
should be based upon strong incentives for companies, as well as the public administration 
V\VWHPWRLPSURYHHI¿FLHQF\7KHDFWLYLW\RIWKHODWWHUPXVWEHRULHQWHGDVPXFKDVSRVVLEOH
WRZDUGFUHDWLQJIDYRUDEOHFRQGLWLRQVIRUHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGPLQLPL]LQJDOOW\SHVRIHFR-
nomic and institutional risks.
The complexity of the basic conditions in which this objective is to be achieved can be 
illustrated with a number of examples.
4.1. Public administration
1. The greater the number of employees in the public administration sector in Russian 
UHJLRQVWKHSRRUHUWKHLUHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH/LEPDQ:HEHOLHYHVXFKDSDUDGR[L-
cal connection is caused by growth in the regulatory burden as bureaucracy grows.
2.  An analysis of factors determining the probability that a governor was reappointed 
in a region between 2005 and 2010 showed no dependence on the economic results of that 
region (Reisinger and Moraski, 2013). At the same time, A. Yakovlev (2015) notes that 
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in China, the promotion of regional administrators is determined primarily by the results 
achieved in the territories under their administration, which probably made the outstanding 
performance of the country possible.
$FFRUGLQJWR5)3UHVLGHQWLDO'HFUHH1RGDWHG$XJXVWWKHXQHPSOR\-
PHQW UDWH VHUYHV DV RQHRI WKH FULWHULD WR HYDOXDWH WKH HI¿FLHQF\RI H[HFXWLYH DXWKRULWLHV





business conditions is the interest in expanding the tax base to increase their own budget 
UHYHQXHV+RZHYHUWKLVLQFHQWLYHFHDVHVWRKDYHDQHIIHFWLIWUDQVIHUVIURPWKHFHQWHUDUHUH-
duced when tax collection increases. An econometric analysis of the distribution of transfers 
between municipalities does not allow the hypothesis about such compensation to be rejected 
(Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, 2003). To solve this problem, an effective mechanism of dis-




1. Russia is ranked 120th out of 144 countries surveyed in terms of protection of property 
ULJKWV:(),WLVFOHDUWKDWWKHVLPSOLFLW\RIWDNLQJRYHUDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VSURSHUW\
reduces the incentives for investment, as successful growth increases the chance of losing the 
EXVLQHVVRUHQWDLOVWKHQHHGWR³SD\RII´
2. In terms of the regulatory burden on businesses, Russia was ranked 111th out of 144 
:()
$MRLQWLQYHVWLJDWLRQE\WKH:RUOG%DQNDQG+LJKHU6FKRRORI(FRQRPLFVVKRZVWKDWLQ
each industry within the Russian economy, the labor performance gap between the top quin-





4. In terms of innovative activity, Russia lags behind not only the most developed count ries 
but all of the emerging markets (Table 7).8 This points to very weak incentives for  Russian 
companies to improve their business performance.
 8 Russia has worse indicators of innovative activity, not only compared with countries from Table 7, but with 
all of the nearly 50 developed countries and emerging markets for which assessments are contained in the above-
mentioned source.
Table 7 
Indicators of innovative activity, 2012.
Country 6SHFL¿FZHLJKWRIFRPSDQLHVSXUVXLQJ
technological innovations






South Africa 65.4 73.9
Source:+6(
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The fundamental nature of the tasks that need to be resolved to build a new economic 
JURZWKPRGHOJURZWKLQFHQWLYHPRGHO²*,0UHTXLUHVQRWMXVWLQGLYLGXDOLQFHQWLYHPHD-
sures but profound changes in economic policy and the public administration system, imple-
PHQWLQJVWURQJLQFHQWLYHVWRLQFUHDVHHI¿FLHQF\,WLVLPSRVVLEOHLQDVLQJOHDUWLFOHWRSURYLGH
GHWDLOHG SURSRVDOV RQ DOO RI WKH LVVXHV WKDW DULVH DORQJ WKHZD\:H FDQ RQO\ RXWOLQH WKH
 general directions. The following key tasks must be resolved to build a GIM.
,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWIRUHDFKGLUHFWLRQVSHFL¿FSURSRVDOVKDYHEHHQGHYHORSHGWKDWLI
implemented, could bring about dramatic progress.9 Moreover, serious measures have been 
GH¿QHGIRUPDQ\NH\LVVXHVWKDWLQDQXPEHURIFDVHVVKRXOGKDYHEHHQXQGHUWDNHQRQH
and-a-half to two years ago.10+RZHYHUWKHDQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDWWKHVHVWHSVHLWKHUKDYHQRW
been taken or have been implemented only as a formality. New measures are hardly needed 
ULJKWQRZ,WLVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWRXQGHUVWDQGZK\SUHYLRXVUHIRUPVDUHQRWEHLQJUHDOL]HGDQG
what measures need to be taken for them to start functioning. Table 8 lists the most important 
tasks to be resolved to build a growth incentive model and the measures already proposed 
(right-hand column).
2IFRXUVH WKHPHDVXUHV OLVWHG LQ WKH ULJKWKDQGFROXPQRI7DEOHVKRXOGQRWEHFRQ-
sidered adequate to achieve the goals; they only provide a direction for economic policy to 
IROORZ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWPRVWWDVNVKDYHEHHQUHFRJQL]HGDVSULRULWLHVDQGDSSURDFKHV
have been outlined. Unfortunately, most of these measures are not being implemented, un-
OLNHWKRVHLQYROYLQJDGGLWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWH[SHQGLWXUHVDQGLQYHVWPHQWV+RZHYHUZLWKRXW
improving the quality of public administration, the implementation of state-funded projects 
will at best yield limited effects in terms of scale and duration.
As an example, we can cite the law enforcement reform concept developed by the Institute 
for the Rule of Law (2013) for the Civil Initiatives Committee.
A diagnostic analysis conducted by the Institute revealed the following systematic reasons 
behind the persistently declining quality of law enforcement:
x H[FHVVLYHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQRIODZHQIRUFHPHQWDJHQFLHV
x prevailing vertical hierarchical coordination;
x multiple parallel governance verticals;
x WKHSHUVLVWLQJ³WLFNVKHHW´HYDOXDWLRQV\VWHPFDXVHGE\FHQWUDOL]HGJRYHUQDQFH
x a lack of external supervision and communication with local communities and civil 
 authorities.
The law enforcement agency reform concept includes three main directions:
a) streamlining law enforcement agency management;
E HOLPLQDWLQJQRQFRUHIXQFWLRQVWKXVUHGXFLQJVWDI¿QJ
c) reforming the system for evaluating and supervising law enforcement agencies. 
As a key step in this reform, a three-level police force is proposed at the federal, regional 
and municipal levels, with distinct authorities, duties and accountabilities at each level. In 
JHQHUDOWKHFRQFHSWSURSRVHVDV\VWHPRILQWHUUHODWHGPHDVXUHVWRIRFXVRI¿FHUVRQVROYLQJ
LGHQWL¿HGLVVXHVZKLOHSUHVHUYLQJDOOQHFHVVDU\ODZHQIRUFHPHQWIXQFWLRQVDQGSHUIRUPDQFH
An example of a task requiring a set of complementary measures is changing the stable 
WHQGHQF\WRUHGXFLQJJURVVSUR¿WDVDVKDUHRI*'37KLVLVDQHVSHFLDOO\FKDOOHQJLQJWDVN
considering the workforce reduction, which places additional pressure on labor compensa-
tion. First, excessive employment must be eliminated wherever it is present; second, if pos-
sible, the labor supply must be increased; and third, wages should not be allowed to grow 
faster than labor productivity. An analysis shows where there are reserves for resolving these 
 9 3URSRVDOVE\.XGULQDQG*XUYLFKDVZHOODV0DXDQG.X]PLQRYZHUHXVHGLQGHYHORSLQJ
the measures below.





Tasks and measures required to build a growth incentive model.
Task Measures required
'UDPDWLFDOO\UHGXFH
the non-market sector, 
including public and quasi-
public companies that are 
mainly guided by non-
market incentives
%HIRUH'HFHPEHUHQVXUHGHYHORSPHQWDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIQRQ





)HGHUDO %XGJHW /DZZHUH58%  ELOOLRQ LQ  DFWXDO UHYHQXHV
ZHUH58%ELOOLRQ
%HIRUH  FRPSOHWH WKH H[LW RI WKH VWDWH IURP FRPSDQLHV LQ WKH QRQ
SULPDU\PDWHULDOVVHFWRUWKDWDUHQRWDI¿OLDWHGZLWKQDWXUDOPRQRSROLHVRUWKH
GHIHQVHFRPSOH[5)3UHVLGHQWLDO'HFUHH1R
5. Restrict the acquisition of shares and stakes in business entities by compa-
QLHVLQZKLFKWKHVWDWHKDVDPDMRUVWDNH5)3UHVLGHQWLDO'HFUHH1R
6. Reduce political or non-commercial instructions from the government to 
public companies.
Motivate the executives 




authorities (FEAs) and the subjects of the Russian Federation based on quali-
WDWLYHDQGTXDQWLWDWLYH LQGLFDWRUVRI WKH LQYHVWPHQWFOLPDWH5)3UHVLGHQWLDO
'HFUHH1R
Create feedback in the 









Redistribute a portion 
of the authorities and 
budget resources to the 




x restore conditions for local administration;
x augment the role of competition as an economic growth incentive.
0DXDQG.X]PLQRY&K
Eliminate the disincentive 
of inter-budget transfer 
distribution mechanisms
,QFUHDVHWKHVKDUHRIREMHFWLYHO\FDOFXODWHGVXEVLGLHVWROHYHORII¿VFDOFDSDFLW\






 %HIRUH 'HFHPEHU   DPHQG 5XVVLDQ )HGHUDWLRQ ODZ WR UXOH RXW
the possibility of resolving business disputes through criminal prosecution 
5)3UHVLGHQWLDO2UGHU1R
Reduce administrative 
control over business 
activities
%HIRUH-DQXDU\UHSODFHH[FHVVLYHDQGRULQHI¿FLHQWDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
mechanisms of government supervision in certain industries with alterna-
WLYHPDUNHWPHFKDQLVPVLQFOXGLQJOLDELOLW\LQVXUDQFH5)3UHVLGHQWLDO2UGHU
No. 601).
2. Introduce the presumption of innocence principle for businesses; switch 




and reform them if 
necessary





 issues: a) the number of employees in the public sector is clearly excessive (Russia sur-
passes developed countries and emerging markets in the number of public employees per 
1,000 population); b) in recent years, wages have been rapidly increasing in a number of 
publicly funded industries, which later spread to the entire economy; and c) Russia has nearly 
the youngest retirement age among comparable countries. In view of the above, the following 
measures may be proposed:
x abandon wage increases in the public sector, which are unrelated to growth in its perfor-
mance;
x streamline the number of public sector employees;
x VZLWFKIURP¿JKWLQJXQHPSOR\PHQWWKHLPSDFWRIZKLFKZLOOKDUGO\EHVLJQL¿FDQW WR
¿JKWLQJIRUFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV
x increase mobility and expand workforce re-training;
x improve regulatory mechanisms for immigration to attract employees needed by the labor 
market;




Enhance competition in 
domestic markets
1. Increase the actual weight of the Federal Anti-monopoly Service, focusing it 
on eliminating market-entry barriers and countering the monopolistic activities 
of large companies.






for insolvent companies to exit the market.
Abandon paternalistic 
social policies








the mandatory public review of procurement orders for state and municipal needs 
IRUDPRXQWVH[FHHGLQJ58%ELOOLRQ5)3UHVLGHQWLDO'HFUHH1R
Enhance competition 
in the government 
procurement sector
%HIRUH'HFHPEHUFUHDWHPHFKDQLVPVWRDWWUDFWIRUHLJQRUJDQL]DWLRQV
possessing advanced technology to participate in road construction tenders 
5)3UHVLGHQWLDO'HFUHH1R
Implement further reforms 
in public sectors
Education, healthcare, law enforcement, and other reforms.
Increase the overall 
effectiveness of public 
expenditures
$PRQJ WKH PDLQ UHVHUYHV IRU RSWLPL]LQJ IHGHUDO EXGJHW H[SHQGLWXUHV WKH
IROORZLQJZHUHQRWHGLQWKH3UHVLGHQWLDO%XGJHWDU\$GGUHVVIRU± a:
x ensuring long-term balance in the pension system with a gradual reduction 
RI VXEVLGLHV IURP WKH IHGHUDO EXGJHW WR WKH3HQVLRQ)XQG RI WKH5XVVLDQ
Federation;
x streamlining government procurement;
x streamlining federal institutions and the number of public-sector employees.






changes in the pension system to become effective in 2015 do not solve the aging population 
SUREOHPDQGVHFRQGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHIXQGHGV\VWHPKDVEHHQIUR]HQIRUWZR\HDUVIXUWKHU
aggravating the long-term imbalance. Investors understand clearly that without robust mea-
sures to eliminate these problems, pension-related issues will have to be solved by raising 





actions when measures are canceled or revised shortly after they are announced.
,WLVHVSHFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWWRUHVWRUHLQYHVWRUFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHSURVSHFWVIRULPSURYLQJWKH
business environment in Russia. As a general principle, a long-term moratorium on deterio-
rating the business environment may be introduced. In the event of urgent necessity, changes 
could be adopted that would have indirect negative consequences on the business environ-
PHQWDOWKRXJKWKLVVKRXOGEHRIIVHWE\RWKHUPHDVXUHV WKDWHQVXUHVLJQL¿FDQWEHQH¿WVIRU
businesses.
It is important to support previously formed trends, particularly the borrowing of ad-
YDQFHGWHFKQRORJ\7KLVDSSURDFKKDVEHHQUHFRJQL]HGDVWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHIRULQFUHDVLQJ
productivity in the countries at the same stage of development as Russia. It should be un-
derstood that no country is capable of creating all technical innovations from scratch. Thus, 
the total research and development expenditures in the 10 leading countries exceed Russia’s 
expenditures by more than 30 times (calculated based on purchasing power parity).
As noted above, to build a new growth model, we need to substantially alter the course of 
DFWLRQIRUH[HFXWLYHDXWKRULWLHVDQGEXVLQHVVHV+RZHYHUDWWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHWKHPDLQUROH
will be played by the authorities, who will be required to:
x create a new system of incentives as part of the public administration system;
x begin forming a real market environment for businesses;
x showcase by personal example the approaches that may be used to reduce costs and in-
FUHDVHRSHUDWLRQDOHI¿FLHQF\
The resolution of tasks from Table 8 will enable a large step toward building a new growth 
model that is independent of foreign resources. Stronger incentives create demand among 




well as labor compensation by raising demand and creating opportunities for further techno-
ORJLFDOPRGHUQL]DWLRQ7KHSRWHQWLDO WRDFFHOHUDWH5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWKZLOOEHYHU\
high if this plan is implemented.
'LUHFW ORVVHV FDXVHG E\ DQ LQHI¿FLHQW DQWLPRQRSRO\ SROLF\ DUH DW OHDVW RI*'3
5$1(3$  6LJQL¿FDQW JDLQV DUH FRQQHFWHGZLWK WKH UHGLVWULEXWLRQ RI UHVRXUFHV WR
PRUH HI¿FLHQW SURGXFHUV E\ UHPRYLQJ VRIW EXGJHW FRQVWUDLQWV 6WUHDPOLQLQJ UHVRXUFH GLV-
WULEXWLRQPD\KDYHLQFUHDVHG&KLQD¶VWRWDOIDFWRUSURGXFWLYLW\E\±DQG,QGLD¶VE\
±+VLHKDQG.OHQRZ:HEHOLHYHSRWHQWLDOJDLQVZRXOGEHDWOHDVWHTXDOIRU
5XVVLD7KHSRWHQWLDO IRUDGGLWLRQDOJURZWKRI WKH5XVVLDQ*'3IURPVXFFHVVIXOO\ LPSOH-





of coordinated and complementary reforms rather than separate measures. In particular, it 
is impossible to achieve positive effects from reforms without adequate property protection 
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(Christiansen et al., 2009). The worst course of action is to discontinue all production support 
while maintaining excessive government regulation and other pressure on businesses.
The proposed approach to building a new growth model is far from easy, requires strong 
SROLWLFDOZLOODQGLQYROYHVXQSRSXODUUHIRUPV1HYHUWKHOHVVZHDUHFRQ¿GHQWWKDWWKHUHDUH
no viable alternatives to this course.
5. Conclusion
6XPPDUL]LQJWKHUHVXOWV
1. Russia has shaped an economic growth model based on transforming oil and gas sur-
SOXVUHYHQXHVZKLFKH[FHHGHG58%WULOOLRQIURPWRLQWRGRPHVWLFGHPDQG




2. In the near future, we can hardly hope for a return of the ideal conditions under which 
the imported growth model was shaped. Consequently, there is little chance for the Russian 
economy to stop stagnating without creating a new growth model.
3. The problems of the Russian economy are of a persistent nature and cannot be resolved 
ZLWKLQGLYLGXDOPHDVXUHVVXFKDVVRIWHUPRQHWDU\RU¿VFDOSROLFLHV7KHUHDVRQVIRUWKHVH
problems are the weaknesses in the market environment caused by the domination of public 
and quasi-public companies with distorted incentives (compared with the usual market logic) 
DQG³LQIRUPDO´UHODWLRQVZLWKWKHVWDWH
4. The measures discussed or implemented today are not consistent with the scale of prob-
lems facing the Russian economy. For the most part, they suggest somehow expanding do-
mestic demand, which will allow the effects of the old growth model to be extended only for 
a short period of time but will not help create a new growth model.
5. A new growth model should be based upon strong incentives for both the business and 
JRYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQV\VWHPVWRLPSURYHHI¿FLHQF\7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHJXODWRU\EXUGHQ
must be radically reduced, and property rights must be protected. It is essential to ensure 
strict and equal market accountability for the performance results of all companies, regard-
OHVVRIWKHLUDI¿OLDWLRQDEDQGRQLQJWKHLQGXVWULDOSDWHUQDOLVPSULQFLSOH
6. A number of the steps required to build a new growth model are mentioned in presi-
dential decrees and other regulatory documents. Unfortunately, most of them are not being 
followed or are only partially followed, unlike the frequently passed resolutions on allocating 
funds for governmental projects.
7. The potential to accelerate growth in the Russian economy will be very high if the plan 
DERYH LV LPSOHPHQWHG+RZHYHU LWZLOO UHTXLUHDZKROHVHWRI UREXVW UHIRUPV UDWKHU WKDQ
separate, scattered measures.
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